Reconnaissance Fires Complex Part 2: Why No Breakthroughs?

25 Minute Read

Year 4 of the Russo-Ukraine War is about to start, and things are not looking good for the Ukrainians and haven’t for some time. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) has had mobilization problems since early 2023 that have never been fixed, with significant manpower shortages specifically within the infantry. The average age for soldiers is 45 years old, basic training is typically only 30 days, and AFU brigade-level staff training is just three weeks long. Their reserves are largely committed, their combat units exhausted, they are begging for infantrymen, but despite that, they’re still holding back the Russians from scoring an offensive breakthrough.

If the Ukrainians are so weak, why can’t the Russians breach, penetrate, and exploit the Ukrainian lines and achieve a tactical and operational victory? Why are only incremental gains possible?

Because the Ukrainians aren’t weak where it counts, and where it counts is their Reconnaissance Fires Complex.

Ramifications of a Defense-in-Depth of Fires

Much ink has been spilled about how the Ukrainians are using a defense-in-depth to hold back the Russians. And it’s true. Well, sort of. Due to AFU deficiencies in their infantry, it’s not possible to be arranged in depth anymore, they are essentially performing a forward defense because the infantry units of the maneuver brigades of the AFU are overextended. And despite being in a forward defense, they are still dispersed greatly too, with large gaps between defensive positions making them unable to mutually support each other. Maybe not everywhere, but it seems to be a prevailing theme.

This should present opportunities for the attacker to score a breakthrough. A century plus of offensive doctrine involving bread and butter maneuver warfare says to find one of these gaps, mass, breach the obstacles, destroy the front line defensive positions or bypass the holdouts, penetrate to the tactical rear, and exploit by driving deep into the enemy’s operational rear.

If only it were that easy…

Let’s examine a traditional mechanized attack and how it would fare against a weakly held forward defense defended by a well-supplied and effective Reconnaissance Fires Complex. For the sake of this discussion, we’ll limit the fictional attack to a reinforced mechanized company, with a platoon of tanks accompanying three platoons of infantry fighting vehicles and their dismounts, with an attached section of engineering support vehicles meant to reduce obstacles and clear lanes of mines. Their orders are to breach the main line of resistance to take a platoon-sized defensive strongpoint, with follow-on forces to press through for a breakthrough operation.

Upon receiving orders to conduct the attack and individually preparing, those mechanized units must meet up with one another at an assembly area. While there is no hard rule on how far back those need to be from the forward line of troops, they’re supposed to be concealed from enemy observation, preferably outside of enemy medium artillery range, because assembling in a small area makes for a ripe target. So how far back is the assembly area supposed to be in a transparent battlefield? Credible reporting suggests recon drones are often overflying deep into the tactical rear areas, sometimes well into the operational rear areas. That means our fictional mechanized company has a roughly 10-15 kilometer approach march from their assembly area just to reach the enemy. And even then, there is the possibility that they still might be detected in the assembly area by drones and engaged by long-range fires.

Now we need to crunch some numbers to figure out how long it's going to take that mechanized company to reach its objective. I couldn’t find current Russian doctrine but older Soviet-era manuals describe the approach march speed as around 20 kilometers per hour. But for argument's sake let’s imagine this mechanized task force is driving the max off-road speed of accompanying infantry fighting vehicles of 45 km/hr, they’d still need about 15-20 minutes to cross friendly tactical rear area and traverse No-Man’s Land, all the while potentially being detected by enemy drones and engaged.

And that doesn’t factor in the threat of anti-tank mines emplaced along every known route in the attacker’s tactical rear areas courtesy of enemy utility drones and/or rocket-launched Family of Scatterable Mines systems. That requires all any motorized/mechanized attacking force to move in column formation with either a dedicated engineering support vehicle or tank equipped with a mine-plow/roller. Deployed and plowing, that reduces the column’s march speed to about 12 km/hr, meaning the approach march might realistically take a full hour, all the while potentially being detected by enemy drones and engaged.

That all sounds very risky already, but the hard part hasn’t started.

Sporadic mines might have been possible on the approach march but enemy defensive positions are very likely going to be protected by wide and dense minefields, tank ditches, and other obstacles, meant to be covered by direct observation by defending ground forces, not to mention more recon drones. Our theoretical mechanized company must conduct a combined arms breach, a mission the US Army considers one of the most complex and difficult to successfully execute in combat, not a surprise as there are just so many things that can go wrong.

This is what the US Army thinks a combined arms breach should look. If like you have twenty minutes of free time, I recommend you watch it. Afterwards, ask yourself this: how the fuck is any of that possible in the Russo-Ukraine War?

How are the enemy’s defenses suppressed in their depth, including their fires, when they’re incredibly dispersed, hidden, and dug in? For that matter, how are enemy drones suppressed when EW or air defense can’t do it reliably? How does a mechanized force on the move obscure itself not only from the ground view of the enemy but also from the bird’s eye view of a drone, which might come from any angle? Would traditional smoke obscuration even work against the POV of a recon drone, often possessing thermal/FLIR capabilities?

If the attacker can’t adequately suppress the defenders and they can’t obscure themselves, how are they supposed to secure, reduce, and assault through the obstacles? Let alone perform the rest?

“If They can be Seen on the Battlefield, Then They will be Hit."

Think about the ramifications so far of the complexities involved in a mechanized breakthrough.

At this point in our fictional attack, the mechanized company will have conducted a lengthy, long approach march to then have performed a breach most likely without the benefits of SOSRA, very likely under observation from drones who will direct accurate and responsive fires on them. But for the sake of understanding the implications, let’s say the attacking task force succeeded in the breach, and now are moving forward to destroy or bypass the enemy’s forward defensive positions and beyond.

Based on Soviet-Russian-Ukrainian doctrine, and exacerbated by excessive strategic frontages, defenders need to remain dispersed. The Ukrainians tend to use squad and platoon-sized strongpoints covering an approximately kilometer-wide frontage, potentially screened by fireteam or squad-sized outposts. These positions tend to be hidden and dug-in well enough to survive against the Russian drone-directed recon fires complex, and are typically situated to hold key terrain features that the Russians will mostly likely be attacking, relying on attached ATGM teams or organic AT rockets to engage Russian armor as they advance into pre-designated “fire sacks” kill zones in front of their positions, and using machine guns and small arms to repel ground attacks.

No easy objective to take, with ATGMs they’ll typically have range overmatch on any tank or IFV cannon present with our fictional attacking mech company. But let’s say the forward defensive positions are adequately suppressed by supporting fires and aren’t a problem. Will the attack succeed? Let’s say they do. The strongpoint has been destroyed, and everyone occupying it are casualties or surrendering. Victory at last! Now what?

Why would defensive fires let up? Why would recon drones suddenly fly home? Why would various tactical operation centers turn off the live drone feeds and ignore the situation? If anything, should the attack succeed, resistance in the form of drone-directed fires will only intensify. The greater the success of the attack, the greater the response in the forms of fires galore directed against a dozen plus armored fighting vehicles easily spotted in the open. And thus starts the Turkey Shoot, if it hadn’t already started.

What happens to the attacking mechanized company if they just decide to hold tight and set up a hasty defense to consolidate whatever limited objective they took? They take the strongpoint, now they just need to hold it. Well, the problem is they’re still visible, they can be detected and engaged. And thanks to drones, gone too are the days in the past when an armored vehicle could pause and take up hasty defensive positions like going into defilade or vehicle hide positions like this. That works great against observers at ground level from the direction of enemy-held territory, but it does nothing to hide from the bird’s eye view of a drone, where only elaborate overhead cover/concealment can hide them. Not something easy for an attacking mech unit to find on their march.

Essentially what happens with mechanized attacks is that as soon as an attacking force is detected by the defenders, a clock starts. The longer the clock runs, the more attrition they’ll take. It’s nearly impossible to hide individual vehicles without prepared vehicle hide sites located in their own tactical rear. If they remain in the open within drone range of the enemy, they most likely will eventually be detected and engaged. Moving or stationary, they are very vulnerable.

If survival requires our mechanized company being invisible, how can they advance deep enough to penetrate the defense-in-depth-of-fires?

They can’t.

“Mass Kicks Ass Is Ass”

Let’s change things up and launch a fictional battalion-sized mechanized attack instead of company-sized. Fuck it, let’s attack with a whole division!

Will increasing the size of the attacking force increase the chance of success? If so, what mechanism causes that, when the defeat mechanism for earlier failure was drone-directed fires? Is success based on an assumption that the enemy can’t kill everyone attacking? But what if they do have enough ammo to kill everyone? Is that a chance any commander should make? How many times can field commanders afford to take that risk, fail, and not be relieved for cause? How can their personnel induction system, necessary to replace losses, survive that?

Without a tactical or technical solution to the enemy’s drone directed recon fires complex, adding mass to an attacking force without countermeasures to dismantle the recon fires complex doesn’t mitigate the threat, it only increases the chances of triggering a mass casualty event with severe and embarrassing losses when the attacking forces end up the victim of a bloody Turkey Shoot.

“Bite and Hold” in the 21st Century

If traditional mechanized breakthroughs can’t work against a defense built on a highly functioning Recon Fires Complex, what’s left? This system has got to have a weakness, right?

The historical counter to a defense-in-depth is with incremental limited attacks, not trying to penetrate it but constantly nibbling away at the edges, called "bite and hold" tactics. And that’s exactly what’s worked in the Russo-Ukraine War since at least late-2022. And what’s most unusual is that these incremental Bite and Hold attacks are most successful when performed by small unit dismounted infantry units, almost never above platoon-sized, potentially even down to fireteam-sized.

Wait a second! Full Stop. Back the fuck up! How is that possible?

After all, didn’t the entire history of the 20th Century of warfare demonstrate that dismounted infantry attacks don’t work against modern military technology? Wasn’t that why tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were built in the first place? And I’m to believe that small groups of infantrymen are more successful than armor, and doing it in small units too? How can that work?

I mentioned already how far back from the forward line of troops the assembly areas for mechanized attacks must be located due to the recon drone threat. In comparison, infantry assault groups can start their approach march right from the most forward frontline positions. Why? Because they can do so hidden. They can even infiltrate into No-Man’s Land earlier to stage at rally points closer to their objective. The shorter the distances to travel, the less exposure they have to being spotted by recon drones.

And which is easier to spot by the drone? A formation of moving armored vehicles will have a much more substantial visual signature than a dispersed small unit of infantrymen moving on foot, including their thermal signature.

When contemplating defensive coverage of potential enemy avenues of approach, there can only be a certain number of recon drones airborne at any given time conducting surveillance; while there isn’t a reliable means to disable/destroy enemy recon drones in conjunction with an attack, they’re still vulnerable to electronic warfare and air defenses. For planning purposes and logistics, it’s easier for them to overwatch known or suspected avenues of approach associated with mechanized attacks than trying to cover the entirety of the defender’s frontage trying to detect small groups of dismounted infantrymen moving through an almost infinite number of potential routes, including through restrictive terrain like between and through buildings, woods, swamps, wet areas, steep terrain, through anti-tank obstacles, etc.

It’s widely known that armor can’t hold ground, only infantry can, and that’s never been truer than in the Russo-Ukraine War. As mentioned, the moment an armored formation leaves the assembly area to the point they return they have no real chance of hiding without a well-built vehicle hide site. But dismounted infantry can easily hide along the route to their objective or on it, especially from the birds-eye view of a drone, using any manmade structure with a roof, vegetated woods, not to mention building cover with entrenching tools, or occupying defensive fortifications they take from an enemy. Even tossing up a poncho overhead on the branches of a bush can make them invisible to drones.

And let’s say the small unit of dismounted infantry catches some bad luck, they are not only detected by enemy drones but they are also successfully engaged too. What’s riskier for sustained offensives: Losing a full platoon or more of armored vehicles, their crews, and their infantry dismounts? Or just losing a squad of infantry dismounts?

An Idea So Crazy It Just Might Work!

Raise your hand: Who was shocked upon learning for the first time that the Russians were using dirt bikes and Utility Tactical Vehicles (the so-called “Chinese Golf Carts”) to conduct assaults? Who thought that was utterly ridiculous?

At first, my hand went up too. This tactic just screamed stupid, dangerous, and desperate. And yet it can be all of those things and still be evidence of effective innovation.

The way I came to terms was it was recognizing what made dismounted infantry attacks less risky than massed armored attacks. Then I asked myself, what if the enemy drone-directed reconnaissance fires complex makes armored breakthroughs too risky, but they also make dismounted infantry attacks too risky too? What if the walking distances are too lengthy, or the routes too surveilled?

That’s where the light vehicles come in handy. With their fast acceleration and high speeds, they can cover the distances of No Man’s Land much faster than dismounted infantry can on foot.

I just know a bunch of you reading this are screaming “Shenanigans!” After all, weren’t armored personnel carriers/infantry fighting vehicles literally invented to move infantry faster with added protection?

Absolutely. But as mentioned previously, there are issues with using APC/IFV, specifically relating to the ease with which they are detected and engaged. But light vehicles can be more easily infiltrated forward close to the front lines in small numbers into hide sites, and the closer they are to the enemy, the less time they have to spend under potential drone observation during their advance. And with the ability to traverse constricted terrain better than most APC/IFV, they aren’t nearly as constrained in available avenues of approach. They have more routes available than armored vehicles, and shorter ones too.

I’d never argue that light commercial vehicles with no armor have as good survivability against hits from pretty much every modern weapon system in comparison to legit IFV or APCs. But the Survivability Onion has more than the two layers of “Don’t be Penetrated” and “Don’t be Killed,” the additional five other steps above them deal with avoiding detection, something light vehicles will excel at over AFV.

Picture this: a dispersed handful of dirt bikes tear-assing at breakneck speeds from jump-off positions within a kilometer of their objective. If the drivers don’t wreck, they will have a greater chance not being where the drones are most commonly looking, so not detected. If they are detected, they will be harder to acquire at their fast rates of advance by responding fires, harder to hit.

A Little Goes a Long Ways

Forget for a second how they’re reaching their objective, but how is a small unit of dismounted infantry supposed to be able to succeed in assaulting a well-defended fortified strongpoint position?

That was the hardest part for me to wrap my head around. Especially from having personally served in the infantry and with so many years of research on the topic. A platoon-sized infantry assault force, let alone squad or fireteam-sized, should only be able to take out an equally sized defending unit, or more often smaller than they are.

Are the Russian dismounted infantry assault groups so well-trained and competent that they are basically Tier 1 assaulter level competent? Hell no.

Are the Ukrainian front-line defensive positions so weakly held that a halfway competent Russian squad or even fireteam-sized assault group can successfully capture it? For the most part, minus Kursk especially, it appears so.

As mentioned, the Ukrainian soldiers themselves are reporting significant infantry shortages, inadequate defensive fortifications to fight from, and very extended defensive frontages with around a platoon or less holding a full kilometer of frontage.

But here is the thing, even if the Ukrainians themselves weren’t reporting the above issues, the results speak for themselves. “When you have eliminated all which is impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.” It can only be happening this way.

Due to having too few infantrymen, being too dispersed, having their defensive system overly focused on repelling enemy armor and not enemy infantry (which means defenses can’t be dispersed), adding in poor training, morale issues, etc, it means the Russians can commonly take Ukrainian defensive positions objective with just a squad. Or less.

All it takes is them getting through that pesky recon drone screen intact…

Battle Taxis

What if a small unit of dismounted infantry can’t get through the drone screen on foot or in light vehicle, the routes are just too heavily surveilled? What if the AFU defensive strongpoints are too well defended for only a squad or even a platoon of dismounted infantry to successfully assault, requiring greater mass?

Then it means the mechanized attacks are back on the table. But this time they differ from the previous traditional breakthrough style attack I described above. They still need to do the approach march and the breach, but they will not attempt to penetrate deeper. Instead, they’re acting as an armored battle taxi service to move larger groups of dismounted infantry assault groups to the objective in the fastest and most protective manner possible.

But remember, as soon as they break from cover and concealment, the clock starts and it’s ticking till they’re back out of the range of enemy drones. So armored vehicles can’t stick around near the objective supporting the infantry, or else the drones will detect and engage them. Mission success requires them to advance as close to the objective as possible, drop off the dismounts with their equipment as close to the enemy objective as possible, maybe provide a little bit of close range supporting fires help the assault succeed, but their survivability demands that they retreat ASAP out of drone-fires range. At that point, the dismounts are on their own to successfully assault their objective and then hold it, indefinitely.

Will they be relieved in a timely manner? Unknown.

Will they be resupplied? Unknown.

Will they end up abandoned because there is no guarantee that relief or resupply is possible? Unknown.

C’est La Guerre en Ukraine.

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In the future I would like to follow up this article series with my opinions on the long-term ramifications of net-centric warfare and the recon fires complex, as well as going into potential countermeasures to reliably defeat an opponent’s recon fires complex. But for now, I’m leaving it here. Thanks for reading, and keep your eyes and ears open for them drones!